NTSB Factual Report

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On January 6, 2012, about 1548 mountain standard time, a Piper PA-28-181, N4175V, was substantially damaged when it veered off runway 25L at Phoenix Deer Valley Airport (DVT), Phoenix, Arizona, during the landing rollout. The student pilot was not injured. The instructional flight was operated under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and a visual flight rules (VFR) flight plan was filed and activated for the flight.

The airplane was operated by TransPac Aviation Academy, and was based at DVT. According to the pilot, the flight was a solo cross-country flight, which was to go from DVT to Gila Bend Municipal Airport (E63), then to Wickenburg Municipal Airport (E25), and then back to DVT. The pilot stated that during the landing rollout on runway 4 at E63, the airplane pulled to the right, but the pilot did not experience a runway excursion. After slowing, the pilot exited the runway, and the airplane taxied normally. The pilot stopped the airplane and leaned out the door to check the airplane, but he did not see anything unusual. He did not shut down the engine or exit the airplane at E63. He then departed E63, and did not experience any unusual control behaviors or difficulties with the airplane during the departure or flight.

The pilot made a low approach to E25, but proceeded to go around without landing, since he still had concerns due to his landing experience at E63. He circled the airport a few times, and then departed for DVT, without another approach or landing attempt at E63. The pilot said that his landing at DVT was normal, but that once the nose gear touched down, the airplane veered right, and departed the runway. The airplane struck a runway distance sign, and then a berm. The nose landing gear, right main landing gear, and the right wing sustained significant damage.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The pilot held a student pilot/medical certificate. He had a total flight experience of about 66 hours, all of which was in the accident airplane make and model. He had about 8 hours of solo flight time. His most recent Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) third-class medical certificate was issued in October 2011. The accident flight was not the pilot's first solo cross-country flight, but it was his first flight of the day.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

According to FAA information, the low-wing airplane was manufactured in 1998. It was equipped with a Lycoming O-360 series engine and a fixed pitch metal propeller. The tricycle style landing gear was not retractable. The airplane was equipped with only one cabin entry/exit door, which was located on the right (passenger) side of the airplane.

Review of the airplane flight log revealed that the day prior to the accident, the airplane was flown 8 times, by 12 different pilots or instructors. On the day of the accident, the airplane was flown once prior to the accident pilot's flight. The 9 previous flights put a total of 13 hours on the airplane, and no directional control problems were reported by any of the other individuals.

At the time of the accident, the airplane had accumulated a total time in service of about 10,389 hours total time in service.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

Recorded wind information at an airport about 5 miles south-southwest of E63 (the site of the initial landing irregularity) indicated that the wind speed gradually decreased from 7 to 2 mph between the period from 1300 to 1500; at all those times the wind direction was "variable."

The DVT 1553 automated weather observation included calm winds, visibility 10 miles, clear skies, temperature 21 degrees C, dew point -3 degrees C, and an altimeter setting of 29.97 inches of mercury.

AIRPORT INFORMATION

FAA information indicated that E63 runway 4 measured 5,200 feet long by 75 feet wide, with an elevation of 789 feet above mean sea level (msl). DVT runway 25L measured 8,197 feet long by 100 feet wide, with an elevation of 1,478 feet msl.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The airplane exited the north side of runway 25L, struck a runway distance sign, and continued to slide on the unpaved surface. It came to rest upright in the retention area between taxiway Bravo and runway 25L. The nose and right main landing gear had collapsed or were partially separated from the airplane. The right wing incurred substantial damage from the collision with the sign. The propeller and cowl were damaged from ground contact after the gear collapse. There was no fire. The airplane was recovered to a secure location.

An FAA inspector examined the airplane 6 days after the accident. The inspector reported that he "found nothing irregular" with the airplane. He did not provide a detailed account of his examination.

The insurance company determined that the airplane was damaged beyond economical repair.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Maintenance Information

Review of the maintenance records revealed the following:

- The airplane was on a progressive inspection program

- The most recent phase inspection was completed on December 17, 2011

- The airplane accumulated about 49 hours between the phase inspection and the accident

- Since May 2010, there were eight maintenance events regarding the brakes; these were primarily replacement of worn brake pads

- The most recent replacement of the brake pad linings was completed in November 2011

- Since May 2010, there was one event involving the steering, to correct a loose jam nut on the steering horn. That action was completed in September 2010.

Pilot's Decision-Making and Communication at E63

There were no public telephones available at E63. It was not determined whether the pilot had a mobile phone with him at the time of the event. The pilot reported that he did not shut down the airplane or exit it after landing at E63. He indicated that once he landed at E63, he exited the runway, stopped the airplane in an area where he could set the parking brake, and opened the door to visually check for problems. However, the low wing configuration, right-side door, and idling engine significantly limited the pilot's ability to observe much of the airplane exterior, and completely prevented him from observing the landing gear.

The student reported that since he did not observe any abnormalities by looking out the door, he decided that it was an appropriate course of action to continue the flight, without either further examining the airplane, or contacting the flight school.

Flight School Procedures

The flight school was equipped with a "dispatch" section which primarily served as the communication and coordination link between the students and the flight school regarding operational matters, primarily the scheduling, fueling, release, and return of the school's airplanes. It did not comply with, nor was it required to, the FAA requirements for "dispatch" functions, responsibilities or qualifications under 14CFR 121.

According to the school flight safety manager, each airplane was equipped with a "tin" that he described as "an aluminum container that holds aircraft Hobbs time records, squawk information, VOR check records, and contact information for TransPac and is dispatched with the crew. The manager reported that crews "are advised that they can use any means available to expeditiously communicate with company Dispatch." He further reported that the school dispatch operates a "radio base station" that allows for verbal radio communications to and from airplanes within approximately 50 miles of DVT.

The school flight safety manager noted that "TransPac has a standard policy in place that addresses communication requirements with regard to [off site] abnormalities encountered in flight or taxi. [Flight instructors] participate in a three week standardization course which includes this subject. Students are introduced to these areas in their ground training."

Finally, the manager reported that as of "January 18, 2012, students will be issued a company cell phone to better facilitate the communication process. As part of the Duty CFI or Flight Director position, (this position is there specifically to dispatch, monitor, and provide assistance to all solo missions), the position will be responsible for assignment of company cell phones." The provision of those phones is intended to improve the ability of the school to communicate with its crews (and vice versa) when they are on trips away from DVT.

NTSB Probable Cause

The pilot’s inability to maintain directional control during the landing roll for reasons that could not be determined because impact damage precluded determination of the preaccident functionality of the braking and steering systems.