NTSB Factual Report

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On June 20, 2001, about 1026 eastern daylight time, a Bell 206-L4, N802DS, registered to the Volusia County, (Florida) Sheriff's Department, operating as a Title 14 CFR Part 91pilot's proficiency check ride, sustained a hard landing and rollover while attempting a practice autorotation to a landing at Daytona Beach International Airport, Florida. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed. The rotorcraft received substantial damage and the commercially-rated pilot/examinee and the flight instructor-rated flight examiner received minor injuries. The flight originated from the Ormond Beach Airport about 5 minutes before the accident.

According to the pilot/examinee, the competency check ride was conducted per FAR Part, section 135.293. They had completed two successful autorotations at Ormond Beach and were returning for a final landing and the completion of the check ride to their home base. The examiner chose a spot on the runway for the examinee to conduct a power recovery autorotation, and when the examinee felt he was too high for the spot, performed an "S" turn to lose attitude. As he started a deceleration and rolled the throttle on, the rotorcraft continued to descend, hit the runway hard, and bounced. The rotorcraft then commenced a right yaw and teetered between the left and right landing skids several times until the main rotor impacted the runway and the rollover occurred.

According to the FAA flight examiner, at about 100 feet agl, in a stabilized autorotation, he felt the throttle start moving toward power application at about the proper time and position to effect a safe touchdown. The decelerative attitude was being initiated a little slow and slightly too nose high. He expected to see the Nr and N2 rpms near the upper limits of the rotor tachometer during his scan of the cockpit instruments; however, at about 7 to 10 feet agl, the Nr and N2 rpm pointers were joined at the bottom of the "green arc" , and continued to decay until touchdown, which resulted in a bounce of about one foot. Following the bounce and second contact with the runway, the rotorcraft commenced a violent right spin that oscillated from left to right landing skid two or three times, struck the runway surface with the main rotor, and rolled over on its left side.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The examinee pilot holds a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for helicopter and airplane, single engine land, as well as an instrument rating for airplane. His total flight time was about 8,098 hours. He had accumulated 6,350 hours of Bell 206 flight time, and had received a BFR in the Bell 206 in August , 1999. He flew helicopters in the Vietnam conflict and had flown for the Sheriff's Department since 1982.

The FAA examiner holds a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for helicopter, single engine land, single engine sea, and multiengine land, as well as instrument ratings for airplane and helicopter. He holds instructor ratings in airplane single engine, airplane multiengine, helicopters, and instrument airplane. He has accumulated over 5,000 hours in helicopters, with about 1,800 hours in the Bell 206.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The rotorcraft is one of three used by the Sheriff's Department, primarily for rescue and emergency transportation, therefore the operation, maintenance, and pilot training and currency are governed by the provisions of 14 Title CFR Part 135. N802DS had been acquired by the Sheriff's Department in 1995, and it had acquired 3625.2 flight hours as of May 25, 2001, when the engine underwent a 150 hour inspection. The airframe had received a 100 hour inspection on May 15, 2001 at a total time of 3604 hours. At the time of the accident the total time was 3662.4 hours on the rotorcraft.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

The Daytona Beach METAR for 1027 showed scattered clouds at 2,500 feet agl, 10 statue miles visibility, winds calm, ambient temperature of 82 degrees F, and dew point of 73 degrees F. Remarks section indicated the existence of towering cumulus to the south through the northwest.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The rotorcraft came to rest on its left side, centered on the upwind end of the second of eight white threshold marks on runway 16, on a heading of 250 degrees, magnetic. Runway scars indicated the rotorcraft was in a clockwise, upright yaw just before rollover. The rollover destroyed the main and tail rotors due to runway surface strike. The left windscreen was broken. The left cockpit side window had been kicked out by the examiner to facilitate egress, postcrash. The landing skids were not deformed. The boom had twisted in a counter-clockwise direction, viewed from the rear, and the tail rotor drive shaft was severed. The left vertical fin to the horizontal stabilizer had separated. The lower 8 inches of the vertical stabilizer and tail skag were bent 90 degrees clockwise, viewed from the rear. One of the main rotor pitch change links had separated and was found on the runway about 35 feet at one o'clock to the wreckage. Pieces of main rotor blade were found per wreckage diagram attached to this report.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

Immediately preceding the accident, both pilots volunteered to a urine specimen drug test. Results were negative for both pilots. Neither pilot sustained injuries other than soreness.

TESTS AND RESEARCH

The day following the accident, the rotorcraft was recovered to the Volusia County Sheriff's Department hangar where the "short shaft" was removed and the engine was run to maximum rpm and turbine out temperature. There was no impediment to the smooth operation of the throttle. There was no impediment to the smooth operation of the cyclic or collective. The rudder pedal control path could not be tested postcrash because of tail cone and tail rotor damage; however, the pilot/examinee made no mention of rudder pedal obstruction, precrash.

Federal Aviation Regulations, (FAR) section 61.47 titled, "Status of an examiner who is authorized by the Administrator to conduct practical tests", states in subpart (b) The examiner is not the pilot in command of the aircraft during the practical test unless the examiner agrees to act in that capacity for the flight or for a portion of the flight by prior arrangement with: (1) the applicant, or (2) a person who would otherwise act as pilot in command of the flight or for a portion of the flight. For this particular proficiency check ride, there was no prior agreement for any transfer of pilot in command responsibilities.

NTSB Probable Cause

The failure of the pilot to maintain directional control following a hard landing resulting from a failure to maintain rotor rpm.