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N50340 accident description

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Crash location 33.303889°N, 97.339722°W
Nearest city Krum, TX
33.261507°N, 97.238073°W
6.6 miles away
Tail number N50340
Accident date 07 Sep 2006
Aircraft type Bellanca 7GCBC
Additional details: None

NTSB Factual Report

On September 7, 2006, at 1300 central daylight time, a single-engine Bellanca 7GCBC (Citabria) tailwheel-equipped airplane, N50340, sustained substantial damage when it collided with a metal T-bar and wood fence post during an aborted landing at the Air Cowboy Airport (TE58), near Krum, Texas. The flight instructor and the airline transport pilot receiving instruction were not injured. The airplane was registered to a private corporation and operated by Marcair, Incorporated, of Roanoke, Texas. No flight plan was filed for the training flight that originated from the Northwest Regional Airport (52F), near Roanoke, Texas, about 1230. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the local flight that was conducted under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.

The 1,800-hour flight instructor and the 4,500-hour airline transport pilot (ATP), who was an FAA inspector, were practicing takeoffs and landings in the tailwheel-equipped airplane, when the airplane's left and right wing struts collided with a T-bar and wood fence post during an aborted landing. The ATP had not flown a conventional gear airplane in over 2 years and he rented the airplane for the purpose of recurrency training under the provisions of the FAA's 4040.9D Flight Management Program.

Prior to the flight, the ATP noted that the left brake pedal had excessive travel; however, the flight instructor stated that there had not been any problems reported with the brakes. The ATP and the instructor proceeded to fly to a private airport to practice takeoffs and landings on a 3,501-foot-long, by 250-foot-wide turf runway. The ATP reported that he had never flown into this airport before.

While on the first landing approach, the ATP noted large birds on the runway, so he elected to execute a go-around and the birds dispersed. On the next landing approach, he noted that the birds had returned to the runway. The flight instructor suggested that the ATP land beyond where the birds were located, which was about half-way down the runway. The ATP stated that he maintained an approach speed of 85 miles per hour (mph) as directed by the instructor (normal approach speed is 55 mph). When the airplane touched down on the runway, the ATP realized that the runway sloped downhill and he would not have enough runway remaining to stop the airplane. Additionally, the left brake was not working properly, so he elected to abort the landing. The inspector added full power to abort the landing and the airplane began to climb; however, the right wing strut collided with a metal T-bar and a wooded fence post, which were obstructed by bushes at the departure end of the runway. The ATP was able to maintain directional control of the airplane, but elected to return to the private airport and land. The ATP later stated that he would have needed approximately 2,000 feet of runway to safely land the airplane at the suggested airspeed.

The flight instructor, who also owned Marcair, Inc., provided a similar account of the accident sequence except that he told the ATP than an airspeed between 65 and 80 mph was "good" in the traffic pattern. He also stated that the ATP made a normal landing and there was plenty of runway remaining to stop safely, and he was not sure why the ATP elected to abort the landing. In addition, the flight instructor reported that he had not actually been hired as a flight instructor and was only a passenger on the flight. He knew the ATP was already checked-out in the airplane, and was not aware that he needed instruction or that he was not current in the airplane. The instructor added that FAA personnel had previously asked his employees to join them on flights, and he thought that this was one of those instances.

Both pilots agreed that there was no discussion prior to the flight regarding aircraft performance nor was there any discussion about who was pilot-in-command for the flight.

In an interview with the flight school's dispatcher, she confirmed that the ATP had contacted the flight school several days prior to the accident. She stated that the ATP wanted to rent an airplane and hire a flight instructor. The ATP specifically requested the owner of the flight school to be his instructor. The flight was entered into the school's electronic scheduler program as "w/[flight instructor] (needs 1.5 checkout)", and a confirmation e-mail was automatically sent to the ATP. The dispatcher also contacted the flight instructor and informed him that he had been scheduled for this instructional flight.

An FAA inspector from another Flight Standards District Office (FSDO) examined the airplane at the accident site and later at the operator's maintenance facility. According to the inspector, the right wing (wooden) spar was split about 2 to 3-inches, and the front and aft wing struts on both wings were bent. In addition, the wheel pants, the right horizontal stabilizer and the propeller sustained damage.

Weather at the time of the accident was reported by the instructor as wind from 090 degrees at 10 knots, visibility more than 10 miles, and clear skies.

NTSB Probable Cause

The CFI's and ATP's inflight decision to land halfway down the runway and the ATP's delayed decision to abort the landing. A factor was the ATP's excessive airspeed on final.

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