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N2091W accident description

Virginia map... Virginia list
Crash location 36.780278°N, 76.448889°W
Nearest city Chesapeake, VA
36.819037°N, 76.274940°W
10.0 miles away
Tail number N2091W
Accident date 31 Aug 2013
Aircraft type Piper PA-28RT-201
Additional details: None

NTSB Factual Report

On August 31, 2013, about 1345 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-28RT-201, N2091W, experienced a pitch control failure during takeoff at Hampton Roads Executive Airport (PVG), Chesapeake, Virginia. The airplane was undamaged and the two pilots were uninjured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the local flight, which was operated under the provisions of Title14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.

According to the pilots, the purpose of the flight was to familiarize themselves with the airplane. During takeoff, as they increased the angle of attack to become airborne, they heard a loud "pop" and lost pitch control. The airplane became airborne momentarily and then touched down on the runway in a three point attitude. Neither of the pilots was injured, and the airplane was undamaged.

Examination of the airplane revealed that the aft lower stabilator flight control cable's turnbuckle assembly had broken at the aft cable terminal fitting. Examination of the turnbuckle and aft cable terminal fitting by the NTSB Materials Laboratory revealed that the cable terminal had fractured in the shank region about 0.25 inches from the wrench flats. Areas of the turnbuckle were covered with a white crystalline material, and the shank adjacent to the fracture exhibited reddish orange deposits. Examination of the fractured region with a 5X to 50X binocular zoom stereomicroscope also revealed that the fracture surface was rough with crack branching, which was consistent with stress corrosion cracking. Cleaning of the terminal in the area of the wrench flats and adjacent shank areas using acetone and a scouring pad comparable to a Scotch-Brite general purpose green scouring pad also revealed that some of the reddish orange deposits remained in some of the crevices on and adjacent to the wrench flats. Isolated areas of small pits were also observed on the turnbuckle shanks with a higher density of pits being observed on the outer diameter at the wrench flats. Additionally, a longitudinal crack was discovered at the end of the terminal adjacent to the cable. The area around the crack was also cleaned using acetone and a paper towel, and reddish orange deposits remained adhered to the surface after cleaning.

Review of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records revealed that the turnbuckle assembly was the subject of FAA Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2013-02-13, which was prompted by reports of cable assembly failures that led to failure of the horizontal stabilator control system and resulted in loss of pitch control. This AD required inspection of the stabilator control system and replacement of parts as necessary.

According to FAA and airplane maintenance records, the airplane was manufactured in 1979. The airplane had recently been purchased and was going to be placed in a local operator's fleet for rental and use in their pilot training program. As part of the purchase it had undergone an annual inspection on July 21, 2013. At the time of the inspection, the airplane had accrued 6,100.3 total hours of operation. At the time of the incident the airplane had 6,106 total flight hours.

According to the airframe and powerplant mechanic's logbook entry for the annual inspection, Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2013-02-13 (effective March 11, 2013) had been complied with during the annual inspection by inspecting the cables in accordance with Piper Service Bulletin (SB) 1245A. The inspection as described in SB 1245A required that the mechanic disassemble the turnbuckle assembly and clean it using a solvent such as acetone. Use of a Scotch-Brite general purpose green scouring pad was also permitted for cleaning. A 10x magnifier, a mirror, and a suitable light source were then required to be used to inspect the turnbuckle, terminal, and adjacent segment of cable. Any evidence of cracks, cable fraying, or corrosion that remained after the cleaning was cause for replacement.

NTSB Probable Cause

Maintenance personnel’s inadequate inspection and compliance with a Federal Aviation Administration airworthiness directive, which resulted in an undetected corroded and cracked stabilator turnbuckle and the subsequent failure of the turnbuckle and loss of elevator control during takeoff.

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